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Abstract
We use methods from network science to analyze corruption risk in a large administrative dataset
of over 4 million public procurement contracts from European Union member states covering the
years 2008-2016. By mapping procurement markets as bipartite networks of issuers and winners of
contracts we can visualize and describe the distribution of corruption risk. We study the structure
of these networks in each member state, identify their cores and find that highly centralized markets
tend to have higher corruption risk. In all EU countries we analyze, corruption risk is significantly
clustered. However, these risks are sometimes more prevalent in the core and sometimes in the
periphery of the market, depending on the country. This suggests that the same level of corruption
risk may have entirely different distributions. Our framework is both diagnostic and prescriptive: it
roots out where corruption is likely to be prevalent in different markets and suggests that different
anti-corruption policies are needed in different countries.
1 Introduction
Ever since states have existed, they have sought to count and track their citizens in order to tax and
control them [1]. Modern states record their own activities in great detail. Just as the digital traces of
individuals contain valuable insights about everything from their health to their socioeconomic status [2],
the administrative Big Data maintained by the state can be used to analyze its successes and failures [3].
One such failure that is surprisingly persistent even among economically advanced and democratic states
is corruption, which we frame as the “deliberate restriction of open and fair access to public resources
for the benefit of connected actors” [4]. Corruption is indeed a significant failure of governance, as it
has been shown to slow growth [5] and innovation [6] and to subvert democracy [7], while compounding
inequality [8].
Despite its importance corruption is difficult to measure because individuals engaging in corruption
obviously want to keep it a secret. Ground truth examples of convicted corrupt actors are hard to come
by and anyway form a biased sample: large-scale corruption often goes unpunished because the state,
including law enforcement and the judiciary, have been captured by corrupt interests [9]. For these
and other reasons corruption is traditionally measured via surveys which suffer from well-documented
shortcomings [10, 11].
The significant amount of administrative data collected by governments presents an opportunity to
study corruption risk from a new perspective using new tools of data science. In this paper we mine a
big administrative dataset with over 4 million public procurement contracts in the EU for insights on
the organization of corruption. Public procurement, the process by which governments purchase goods,
services and construction works from the private sector, accounts for up to 20% of GDP [12] and is
known to be vulnerable to corruption [13]. We proxy for corruption risk at the contract level with a
binary indicator that is 1 if there was no competition for the contract. Such single-bidder contracts have
been shown to predict significant risk of corruption [14, 15]. Aggregated to the country level, the rate
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of single bidding correlates significantly with commonly used survey-based measures of corruption or
predict overpricing on the auction level. We mention here that there are a variety of possible indicators
for corruption risk based on the details of the processes of procurement contracts, however, the indicator
based on single bidding is a the best choice for a one-parameter description of corruption [13].
With micro-level data in hand, we apply the tools of network science to map and analyze the distribu-
tion and structure of corruption risks in different European countries. We represent markets as bipartite
networks of the issuers (public institutions, sometimes referred to as buyers) and winners (firms, some-
times referred to as suppliers) of procurement contracts. These bipartite networks have many qualitative
characteristics in common with other empirical networks [16] that distinguish them from random net-
works. For instance they have heterogeneous degree distributions and significant local correlations.
These networks are more than just maps of markets. We argue that they provide an ideal framework
for studying the organization of corruption. There are many reasons to consider corruption as a fun-
damentally networked phenomenon. The most significant disclosed examples of corruption, for instance
the recent scandal involving the Brazilian state-owned oil company Petrobras [17, 18], involve hundreds
of individuals, firms, and institutions. The Petrobras scheme entailed the exchange of billions of dollars
in bribes and kickbacks for the award of public contracts. The size of the conspiracy, of which nearly 100
conspirators - including the former president of Brazil - have been convicted, suggests that it involved a
sophisticated and collective effort. Likewise, network studies of organized crime [19] and terrorism [20]
demonstrate that illegal activity tends to leave complex traces that networks are especially suited to
describe and explain.
We describe the distribution of corruption risk in different procurement markets from two perspec-
tives: the extent to which it is centralized, that is how prevalent it is between actors in the core of the
market versus its periphery; and how clustered it is, describing the extent to which corruption risk is
bunched in different parts of the network. We find that in some EU countries corruption risk is more
common in the core of the market, while in others it is more common in its periphery. In every country
in our database corruption risk is clustered, though the magnitude of this effect varies significantly. Our
results are compared to realistic null models, which take into account the overall magnitude of corrup-
tion risk as well the propensity of governments in different countries to purchase different goods and
services. Our findings have significant implications for both the academic study of corruption and prac-
tical anti-corruption efforts. Observing that corruption seems to be organized in different ways suggests
that different anti-corruption strategies may be effective in different contexts.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys related work, including recent work on the
measurement of corruption risk via public procurement contracts. Section 3 describes the data and
corruption risk indicator. Section 4 introduces the network measures of the distribution of corruption
risk in markets. Section 5 concludes and suggests ideas for future research.
2 Related Work
Big data has been applied to a variety of social and economic problems in domains including health [21],
scientific research [22], urban mobility [23, 24], and development [25]. The digitization of our social and
professional lives have facilitated most of this work, providing researchers access to high resolution trace
data about human behavior and activities. Often the data analyzed is “found data” - data which was not
originally collected for the purpose of the research. Data collected from public administrative databases,
for example public procurement, falls into this category [26].
The study of corruption using big administrative data is a new and evolving area of research with
its own challenges. It represents a major departure from previous empirical studies of corruption which
leverage perception-based surveys for macro studies and experiments at the micro level. Below we briefly
survey these three broad branches of research on corruption.
The most prominent and longest running survey-based measures of corruption are Transparency In-
ternational’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) [27] and the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance
Indicators (WGI) [28], both available since the 1990s. Both measures, quantifying corruption and qual-
ity of government at the national level, are composite indicators, mixing general population and expert
surveys about perceptions and experience. The measures are highly correlated (ρ > .9) and are designed
to be consistent over time. The significant complexity of weighing or including components and correlat-
ing observations year to year has lead some researchers to criticize the validity and broad application of
these measures [10, 29]. More recent attempts to resolve some of these issues or to create more consistent
measures include the Bayesian Corruption Index [30], the Varieties of Democracy (V-DEM) indicator
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of political corruption [31], and the Quality of Government Institute’s (QoG) European Quality of Gov-
ernment Index (EQI) [32]. The latter index is calculated at the regional level, enabling the study of
corruption perceptions at the sub-national level.
Experimental studies of corruption have the advantage of allowing researchers to directly measure
causes or levels of corruption in specific contexts by precise specification. For example, to study the
influence of culture on corruption Cameron et al. [33] observed individuals from different cultures playing
games with both an economic incentive to cheat and a mechanism to punish cheaters. Interestingly, they
found greater variation in the propensity to punish corruption than to engage in it across cultures. Weisel
and Shalvi [34] observe pairs of individuals playing a dice-rolling game in which pairs can increase their
payout by cheating as a team, and find that pairs tend to cheat more often than individuals playing a
similar game alone.
These studies have the clear limitation that they happen in artificial environments. Some experiments
are carried out in the field, though coming with significant higher costs and risks. Perhaps the most
famous of these relating to corruption are Olken’s field experiments in Indonesia [35, 11]. Olken designed
a series of interventions to test the effects of both audits and grassroots organization on corruption
outcomes in 600 Indonesian villages during a national road construction project. Crucially, Olken had
the resources to independently assess the expected cost of the roads in order to estimate actual observed
corruption in each village. He found that pre-announced audits reduce corruption, but that community
organizing induced no change. Such studies are a gold-standard in causal inference, but suffer from
significant costs and limitations in scope.
In recent years researchers have increasingly turned to big data to quantify and study corruption in
the public sector. These studies tend to leverage found data collected and curated by governments for
other purposes. They rely heavily on new trends for open government or e-government [36]. As citizens
increasingly demand transparency and public-sector use of information and communication technologies
proliferates, it is reasonable to expect that more data will become available in the future [37]. Data in
the United States on lobbying [38] and campaign contributions [39, 40] have been used to measure the
influence of money in politics. Internationally, large scale firm ownership data reveals how firms avoid
taxes [41]. Crowdsourced data on convicted public officials, for instance extracted from Wikipedia, has
been used to study the emergence of systemic corruption [18].
As mentioned in the introduction, our study leverages big data on public procurement. The scale
and scope of procurement and its status as a key interface between the public and private sectors have
made it a popular topic of research. How do researchers quantify corruption using public procurement
data? Fieldwork suggests that corrupt officials steer contracts to favored firms by restricting competition,
insuring high profits [42]. In general, traces of the strategies used to restrict competition can be extracted
from administrative data on the contracting process, enabling researchers to score individual contracts for
corruption risk. The most general indicator leverages the outcome of the competition directly: whether
the contract attracted a single bidder. Single-bid contracts represent a clear corruption risk.
Single-bid contracting rates have been used as an effective proxy for corruption in various contexts,
including studies on the relationship between corruption and political incumbency [14], the importance of
meritocracy in bureaucratic outcomes [15], the impact of social networks on local corruption [43, 44], and
the effect of campaign contributions on corruption [45]. Procurement-based corruption risk indicators
have the advantage that they apply to micro-level transactions, enabling the study of corruption at
multiple scales. Several previous studies study the distribution of corruption risk in procurement markets
represented as networks. One such study finds that repeated interactions are significantly related to
corruption risk [46], while another demonstrates how procurement markets change when corruption
becomes endemic [13].
Despite the significant interest in corruption as a problem and the proliferation of public procurement-
based big data indicators, we are not aware of research that explores the distributional and structural
properties of corruption in different countries based on the patterns of interactions between public and
private actors. This gap in the literature is surprising given that social scientists have been categorizing
countries by the organization of corruption in their public sectors for decades [47, 48]. We fill this gap by
leveraging the tools of network science, providing an analytic framework to both study the distribution
of corruption risks in countries and to provide tailor suggestions on how to combat it.
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3 Data and Framework
3.1 Procurement Data
Our analytic framework measures corruption risk at a transaction level using data from public procure-
ment contracts. We collected data on all public procurement contracts published in Tenders Electronic
Daily1 (TED), the official journal of public procurement contracts of the European Union, from 2008 to
2016. Both calls for tenders and the announcement of their award are published in TED. EU law requires
that any public procurement contract exceeding an estimated value of 5.2 million Euro for works and
135 thousand Euro for services and supplies must be published on TED. TED estimates that over 400
billion Euro of total contract value is published in its pages every year, accounting for nearly 3% of EU
GDP. Though the high thresholds exclude a significant number of contracts from our data, using only
data from TED maximizes the international comparability of our analyses.
Our final dataset consists of 4,098,771 contracts awarded in 2008-2016. We consider 26 member states
of the EU, excluding Luxembourg because of the relatively small number of contracts awarded there and
Croatia because it only joined the EU in 2013. We also exclude contracts awarded by EU institutions
(the Commission, Parliament, Council) as we aim to compare countries.
We processed the dataset to deduplicate the identities of each contract’s issuing buyer (i.e. public
institution such as a ministry or city hall) and supplying winner (i.e. a private firm). Given that our
analytic approach requires an accurate map of the interactions between issuers and winners, we developed
a pipeline to maximize the accuracy of our deduplication, following the approach of Christen [49]. For
each country, we preprocessed the text data for each entity, used machine learning to select both optimal
string similarity measures and blocking methods, and selected a clustering threshold maximizing accuracy
on a manually labeled subsample using the Dedupe computer software [50]. To give an example, the
number of unique suppliers of contracts in France decreased from 364,125 to 200,584. For a more detailed
summary of the procedure see [51].
Besides the issuing buyer and winning supplier of each contract, we were able to extract several
additional pieces of information, including the year the contract was awarded, the Common Procurement
Vocabulary (CPV) code - a EU-wide taxonomy of procurement contracting goods and services [52], and
the number of bidders competing for the contract. We use the later information to score each contract
for corruption risk.
3.2 Corruption Risk
We quantify the corruption risk of procurement contracts using a binary indicator tracking whether
the contract attracted only a single bid in its competition. The use of single bidding as a signal for
corruption risk or “undetected fraud” has recently been suggested by the European Court of Auditors [53].
Nevertheless, it is certainly not the case that any single instance of single-bidding can be used as evidence
for corrupt behavior. For instance, it may be the case that the government is purchasing a niche good or
service with few suppliers on the market or under emergency circumstances - certainly it is more likely
for such contracts to be awarded to a single bidder.
Two aspects of our data mitigate these limitations to the validity of single-bidding as a signal of
corruption risk. The first is that the high threshold of contract values insure both visibility and interest
from the private sector. Secondly, the null models we create to benchmark our measures consider the
CPV code of the contract, distinguishing between contracts for different categories of goods and services,
such as medicine and furniture.
We plot the single bidding rates with of each country over the 2008-2016 period in Figure 1. We
see significant variation, with single bidding rates below 10% in some countries and over 30% in others.
How do these measures of corruption risk correlate with the survey-based perception indicators men-
tioned in the previous section? In Figure 2, we correlate the average single bidding rates from 2008-2016
with Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (TI CPI) [27], the World Bank’s Control
of Corruption Index (WB CoC) [28], Varieties of Democracy’s Corruption Index (V-Dem Corruption
Index) [31], the Quality of Government (QoG) Institute’s European Quality of Governance Index (Euro-
pean Qual. Gov. Index) [32], and the Bayesian Corruption Index (BCI) [30], each measured in 2013 (this
was the most recent year for which all five indicators were available). In each case we find a significant
correlation between country-level single bidding rates and worse corruption or quality of government
outcomes (Pearson correlation between .65 and .72).
1https://ted.europa.eu
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Figure 1: Single-bidding rates on procurement contracts on TED, 2008-2016 by country.
Our data offers several advantages over the survey-based indicators. Surveys encode subjective per-
ceptions about corruption that may be biased. For instance, past research by Olken found that perceived
corruption exceeds actual corruption when ethnic diversity is high [11]. This is a significant obstacle when
we would like to compare the rate of corruption across countries. Moreover, the way such indicators are
calculated is often modified from year to year, again making comparison difficult. From our perspective,
however, the most significant advantage of the single-bidder measure of corruption risk is that it is ob-
served at a granular level; surveys are expensive and, with few exceptions [32], are not carried at the
sub-national, e.g. regional level. We exploit that our indicator is available at the transaction level in the
following section by introducing our network science-based analytic framework.
4 Network Analysis
Public procurement markets can be described as bipartite networks because of the clear division of their
participants into issuers and winners. Bipartite networks have been applied to the study of systems
including two kinds of actors including flowers and their pollinators [54], cities and industries present
in them [55], and buyers and sellers in markets [56]. We apply the same paradigm to our data on
procurement markets: for each country and year in our dataset, we create bipartite networks in which
issuers and winners are connected by a weighted edge, with weight counting the number of contracts
between the two entities.
The standard analysis of a complex network is based on null models, which are randomized versions
of the empirical system. The statistical observations made on the empirical network is compared to those
obtained on the randomized versions. Significant differences can be interpreted as results of correlations,
which are eliminated by the randomization process.
In Table 1 we report summary of the raw statistics of each country’s procurement market network,
averaged over 2008-2016. In all cases the average weighted degrees of nodes (counting the number of
contracts the node is involved in) are smaller than their standard deviations, indicating heterogeneous
degree distributions.
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Figure 2: The 2008-2016 single bidding rate of each country correlated with various perception-based
measures of corruption, all measured in 2013. When correlations are negative, the perception-based
measure refers to positive outcomes, for instance quality of government or control of corruption.
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Country # Contracts # Winners # Issuers Density R-A Clust. µ(DegW ) σ(DegW ) µ(DegI) σ(DegI)
AT 3314 1882 395 0.0033 0.03 1.8 2.3 8.4 22.7
BE 6674 3046 1039 0.0014 0.02 2.2 4.4 6.4 15.2
BG 8653 2150 484 0.0048 0.27 4.0 14.6 17.9 56.3
CY 916 403 64 0.0179 0.14 2.3 3.7 14.3 48.7
CZ 8030 2933 986 0.0017 0.04 2.7 7.4 8.1 32.7
DE 32339 15395 4049 0.0004 0.03 2.1 5.2 7.9 23.5
DK 4858 2099 539 0.0028 0.04 2.3 4.1 8.9 26.5
EE 1913 967 170 0.0083 0.08 2.0 2.6 11.0 28.9
ES 20035 7496 1765 0.0011 0.13 2.7 6.8 11.3 31.8
FI 6248 2750 578 0.0029 0.05 2.3 12.2 10.8 27.4
FR 120946 42562 6294 0.0003 0.08 2.8 11.5 19.3 51.4
GR 4246 2348 437 0.0031 0.12 1.8 2.2 9.7 44.0
HU 5700 2016 610 0.0026 0.08 2.8 5.9 9.4 27.4
IE 2713 1587 208 0.0056 0.03 1.7 2.3 13.1 51.3
IT 18249 7749 2434 0.0006 0.07 2.4 7.2 7.5 29.0
LT 9007 1368 272 0.0084 0.32 6.5 40.2 32.5 178.2
LV 9451 2148 262 0.0057 0.15 4.3 14.8 36.1 119.4
NL 6691 3579 1136 0.0013 0.02 1.8 2.6 6.0 14.7
NO 3479 1899 497 0.0031 0.04 1.8 2.7 7.0 12.6
PL 108886 19079 3649 0.0006 0.23 5.7 64.7 29.7 96.9
PT 2255 1052 334 0.0041 0.08 2.1 3.1 6.7 30.4
RO 19807 3503 939 0.0025 0.32 6.0 44.5 21.1 72.5
SE 9441 4721 724 0.0022 0.06 2.0 3.7 13.1 33.3
SI 6623 1268 448 0.0067 0.27 5.2 18.7 14.8 33.3
SK 2654 1068 344 0.0043 0.09 2.4 5.1 8.1 32.5
UK 32275 15577 2230 0.0006 0.04 2.1 3.7 14.6 50.0
Table 1: Summary statistics of procurement market networks, averaged over 2008-2016. R-A Clust. refers to Robins-Alexander clustering [57], a measure of
the local correlation of connectivity in bipartite networks, analogous to the clustering coefficient in monopartite networks. The final four columns present the
averages and standard deviations of winner and issuer strengths, their degrees weighted by contract count, respectively.
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Figure 3: The distribution of the number of contracts awarded and won, for issuers (in red) and winners
(in blue), respectively, of procurement contracts in each country, aggregated from 2008 to 2016. The
distributions are plotted on a log-log scale. We report the alpha parameter of a power-law degree
distribution fitted to both distributions in the plot [59].
We inspect the degree heterogeneity of each country graphically in Figure 3. Plotted on a log-log
scale the degree distributions of both issuers and winners are heterogeneous in all countries: some rare
issuers and winners are involved in hundreds, even thousands of contracts across the time span of our
data, while the majority are involved in only a few contracts. This heterogeneity cannot be considered
as a signature of any corruption, it is more related, e.g., to the broad size distribution of firms and
institutions [58].
We also report the Robins-Alexander clustering of each network in Table 1. Robins-Alexander
clustering is defined as the number of cycles of length four in the network divided by the number of
paths of length three [57]. Given that a firm wins contracts from two issuers, and that another firm
wins a contract from one of these two issuers, Robins-Alexander clustering can be interpreted as the
probability that this second firm also wins a contract from the other issuer. This measures the tendency
for local clustering in the market analogous to the clustering coefficient in monopartite networks. The
expected Robins-Alexander clustering of random bipartite networks tends to their density as they get
large [57]. As seen in Table 1, the observed clustering is typically an order of magnitude greater than
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the density of the observed networks. This indicates the presence of significant local correlations in the
markets.
These descriptive statistics indicate that our networks have rich structure which deviates significantly
from random behavior. In the next subsections we introduce two measures of the structure of the market:
its centralization and the extent too which it is clustered. We then exploit these measures to describe
the distribution of corruption risk in each market.
4.1 Core-Periphery Analysis
A common task of network analysis is to highlight the most central and active nodes. Some empirical
networks have a group of densely connected actors at their centers, sometimes called cores [60]. Besides
highlighting important actors, methods to detect network cores can be used to compare the degree of
centralization in a network. In this subsection, we adapt a method known as k-shell decomposition to
weighted bipartite networks in order to rank issuers and winners by their centrality in the network. We
say that the most central actors form the core of the market. We measure and compare the relative sizes
of the cores of each procurement market, interpreting a larger core as a signal of procurement market
centralization. We find a strong correlation between market centralization and corruption risk.
In generic unweighted graphs, the concept of a coreness is defined iteratively [61]. To start, all nodes
of degree 1 are assigned a core number of 1 and then removed from the graph. In the next step, all
remaining nodes with degree 1 in the trimmed graph are also assigned core number 1 and then removed.
This process repeats until all nodes have at least degree 2. Nodes with degree 2 are assigned core number
2 and they are the first nodes to be removed in the next iteration of removals. This process yields a
hierarchical decomposition of the nodes in the network by their core number. The k-core of the graph
refers to the subgraph consisting of nodes with core number at least k [62].
Our networks have two features that distinguish them from the graphs considered in this example.
The first is that the edges include weights, encoding the volume of contracts between the focal issuer
and winner. The second aspect is that the different node sets have different degree distributions. We
tweak the concept of the core number and k-core in order to apply it to our networks.
Our method modifies the iterative procedure described above to consider the weighted degrees, defined
as the count of contracts they are involved in as either issuers or winners, respectively, of nodes. Otherwise
the method is identical. As the edge weights in our networks are integers (describing contracting volume),
no further modification is necessary. This is a simplified version of the weighted k-shell decomposition
of Garas et al. [63].
This procedure assigns each node in our network a weighted core number, measuring its centrality in
the network. As we would like to partition the network into a core and periphery, we need to determine
a cutoff for a node to be considered a member of the core. This cutoff should be a function of the size
of the network as it would not be appropriate to use the same cutoff for networks of vastly different
sizes. We also address the concern that issuers and winners have different degree distributions by setting
two different cutoffs for core membership: one for issuers and one for winners. In the end we choose to
consider issuers (respectively winners) as core issuers if their weighted core number exceeds the average
degree of issuers (respectively winners) of the network.
We visualize the Hungarian core in Figure 4, marking edges with above market average single-bidding
rates in red. The visualization highlights the importance of considering the volume of contracting between
issuers and winners in our measure. Issuers and winners can have only a single neighbor and still be
considered for core membership because they may have a high volume of contracts with that neighbor.
We observe that the core has a consistent size over time, and remains densely connected in all years.
We confirm that in general the weighted core subgraph has a much higher density in a summary statistics
table included in the appendix. In general between 20 to 60% of all contracts awarded in a given country
are between core issuers and winners.
We now pose two questions about the relationship between network centralization and corruption
risk measured by single-bidding. First: what is the relationship between the degree of centralization of
a market and its corruption risk. In Figure 5 we plot the relationship between centralization, quantified
by the share of all contracts between core issuers and winners, against corruption, measured by the
overall single bidding rate and the survey-based EQI measure. We find a significant positive relationship
between procurement market centralization and corruption. In the political economy literature there is
an ongoing debate about the relationship between the centralization of government power and corruption.
Our finding supports the side of the debate claiming that centralization facilitates corruption [64].
We are also interested in the distributional nature of corruption risk. Does centralization induce
9
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Figure 4: The weighted core of the Hungarian market from 2008 to 2016. Gray nodes denote issuers
of contracts, while white nodes denote winners. Nodes are included in the core if they engage in many
contracts with other highly active nodes, defined iteratively. Edges are colored red if the rate of single
bidding on contracts between the issuer and winner exceeds the average single bidding rate observed
in the whole market (including the periphery). Note that the core index of each node considers edge
weights encoding the count of contracts between issuers and winners.
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Figure 5: Comparing the centralization of the procurement markets, measured as the share of all contracts
which are between core issuers and winners, and corruption risk quantified by single-bidding and the
European Quality of Government Index (EQI), respectively. All measures are averaged over the years
2008-2016. We report Pearson correlations, both significant at p < .01 and errors indicate 95th percentile
bootstrapped confidence intervals.
corruption by fostering corruption among core issuers and winners? We probe this question by com-
paring the rate of single-bidding in the core against a null model that randomizes the distribution of
single-bidding. Specifically, we preserve network structure and the label of nodes as core or periphery,
but randomly shuffle the single-bidding labels. We restrict the randomization by permuting single-bidder
labels only across contracts with the same two-digit CPV code. This takes into account market specific
effects. For each market we divide the observed rate of single-bidding in its core SBcore by the average
rate of single-bidding in its core over 1000 CPV-preserving randomizations µ(SBrandcore ). Statistical sig-
nificance of any deviation between observation and the distribution resulting from the randomizations
are determined by calculating a z-score. We plot the results averaged over all years for each country in
Figure 6.
Unlike in the previous figure which indicated a strong relationship between market centralization and
corruption risk, no clear pattern emerges. In some countries corruption risk in the form of single-bidding
is significantly over-represented in the core. In other countries it is significantly underrepresented. For
example, Czech Republic and Hungary have similar overall corruption risk scores, but in the former
single-bidding is significantly more common between core issuers and winners, while in the latter it is
more common between actors on the periphery. In the second panel of Figure 6 we show that the size of
the core does not have any significant relationship with the over-representation of corruption risk in the
core.
We draw several conclusions from this analysis. The first is that, as mentioned, there is a strong
correlation between centralization in procurement markets and their overall procurement risk. What is
less clear is by what mechanism this effect might emerge. Our latter findings show that centralization is
not related to higher corruption risk in either the core or periphery in general. The observed heterogeneity
in the tendency of corruption risk to accumulate in the core or periphery of different countries has
important policy implications because the strategies used by corrupt actors to extract rents are likely
very different.
4.2 Edge Clustering
Another dimension of potential heterogeneity in the distribution of corruption risk is its clustering. Pre-
vious research has found that corruption is significantly correlated in the network, with high corruption
risk edges typically bunched together [13]. To demonstrate this idea, we plot the Hungarian procure-
ment market in 2014 in Figure 7. Coloring edges with above-market average rates of single bidding, a
clear pattern emerges: the top left cluster of nodes has significantly higher rates of single bidding than
other parts of the network. We propose to quantify this tendency, as well as the overall tendency of
a procurement market to exhibit topological clustering using community detection. We first group the
edges of the network into communities and measure the quality of this partition. We then calculation
the variation of single bidding rates across communities as a measure.
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Figure 6: Comparing the relative prevalence of single bidding in the core of EU procurement markets
with their overall single bidding rates and the relative core sizes, respectively. Blue points are countries
in which single bidding is less common among core contracts than expected under a sector-preserving
null model. Red points are countries in which the opposite is true: single bidding is significantly more
common in core contracts.
Community detection is a distinguished area of research interest in network science [65]. There
are many methods to partition the nodes of networks into communities. As our object of interest,
corruption risk, is an attribute of network edges, we should rather partition the edges of the network into
communities. There are several well-studied methods used to cluster the edges of networks into so-called
“link-communities”. We adopt one approach based on line graphs [66, 67]. The line graph of a network
is the network obtained if the edges if the original graph are considered as nodes and then connected if
they share a node in the original graph. We transform each of our networks into the corresponding line
graph, obtaining a new network for each one in which the nodes correspond to the original network’s
edges or contract relationships. We can then apply any standard clustering algorithm on the new network
to obtain an assignment of each issuer-winner edge to a community. We apply the Louvain method, a
computationally fast and accurate method commonly used to detect communities in networks [68].
We can also use the partition of the line graphs into communities to describe the extent to which
the networks are topologically clustered. We measure the tendency of edges to be within rather than
between communities detected by the Louvain method using modularity, a quality function of network
partitions. Modularity varies between -1 and 1, with negative scores indicating that edges are rather
present between ”communities” of the given partition than within them, scores around 0 indicating that
there is no difference in the frequency of inter vs intra-community edges, and higher values indicating that
edges are much more likely to be between nodes of the same community rather than across communities.
In other words, higher modularity scores indicate that the network has more distinct and separated
groups of nodes.
We plot each country’s average modularity score from 2008 to 2016 in Figure 8. There is significant
topological clustering in all the networks in our data, similar to what can be observed in our plot of
the Hungarian market in 2014 (modularity .71). Given the partition of the edges of each network
into communities, we can now quantify the extent to which single bidding varies across the different
communities of a network.
The partition of edges in a network, denoting contracting relationships between issuers and winners
naturally gives us a partition of all contracts awarded in a given market. We then calculate the coefficient
of variation of single-bidding across the clusters, defined as the standard deviation of the single-bidding
rates across the contract clusters over the average. As clusters can have significantly different numbers,
we actually calculate weighted standard deviation σWSB and mean µ
W
SB of single bidding across clusters,
defined as follows:
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Figure 7: The 2014 Hungarian procurement market. We plot the largest connected component of the
network, filtering out nodes involved in less than three contracts for the sake of visualization. Nodes are
buyers and suppliers of contracts, connected by an edge if they contract with one another. Edges are
colored red if the single bidding rate on the edge exceeds the average rate of single-bidding that year.
Single bidding is significantly over-represented among the edges in the top left cluster.
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Figure 8: Modularity scores of procurement market networks by country, averaged over 2008-2016.
Higher values indicate more significant topological clustering in the market.
σWSB =
√√√√∑c∈C |c|(sbc − µWSB)2
(|C|−1)
|C|
∑
c∈C |c|
,
and
µWSB =
∑
c∈C |c|sbc∑
c inC |c|
,
where C denotes the set of contract clusters, c is a specific cluster, and sbc is the rate of single bidding
in the cluster c. The weighted coefficient of variation, which in our context we refer to as the clustering
of single bidding, is simply the ratio σWSB/µ
W
SB .
As with our measure of centralization, we compare our observed clustering of single bidding measure
against a suitable null model. We again opt to randomize the single-bidder label on contracts within the
2-digit CPV classes to create a realistic yet randomized distribution to compare against the empirical
data. 1000 times we shuffle the single bidder label on all contracts and recalculate the clustering of single
bidding for these randomized markets. We divide the observed clustering of single bidding by the average
of the 1000 randomized clustering of single bidding scores. We plot the result by country, averaged over
2008-2016, in Figure 9. In every case single bidding is non-trivially clustered within communities in
the network. The magnitude of observed clustering ranges from 2 to over 8 times higher than expected
in the sector-preserving randomization. We interpret this as significant evidence that corruption is not
randomly distributed in the public sector.
The extent to which corruption risk clusters in the market has important policy implications. The
greater the clustering of single bidding in a market, the more likely it is that investigations of the network
neighbors of known corrupt actors will be successful. For example, returning to our visualization of the
Hungarian market in 2014 (see Figure 7), we do not only suggest that corruption risk is significantly
higher in the northwestern community, but also that investigators of corruption in Hungary should
consider this pattern of clustering in the future to shape their strategy.
We now compare our two measures of the distribution of corruption risk in markets. For simplicity
we consider only those countries with above average single bidding rates in our data. We plot the
centralization of corruption risk against its tendency to cluster for these countries in Figure 10. We
observe that although corruption risk is high in all countries, corruption risk within each country is
distributed differently. Countries in the bottom right corner of the plot, such as Portugal and Italy, have
higher corruption risk in the core of their markets and a weaker tendency for risk to cluster. Countries
in the top and center of the plot such as Poland and Latvia have a neutral distribution of risk across the
core and periphery of their markets, but overall risk has a strong tendency to cluster. Finally, countries
such as Hungary, Slovakia, and Estonia have higher corruption risk in their peripheries and a moderate
tendency for risk to cluster.
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Figure 9: Clustering scores of procurement market networks by country, averaged over 2008-2016. Higher
values indicate higher variation of single-bidding rates across communities in the market compared to a
shuffled null model.
This emphasis on the distribution of corruption risk presents a novel way to think about corruption
in a comparative manner. Though it may not be accurate to say that each country with high corruption
risk is corrupt in its own way, these deviations suggest that corruption may be organized in different
ways, likely reflecting political and economic constraints. The differences in topological structure (i.e. the
degree of centralization, measured by the share of contracts in the core of the market, and the clustering of
edges into communities measured by modularity) of the markets also indicate that interesting structures
emerge in the mesoscopic level of this data: between the micro-level of individual transactions and the
global picture of the entire market.
5 Discussion and Future Work
In this paper we applied network science methods to mine a big administrative dataset on public pro-
curement contracts for insights on the distribution of corruption risk. We found that countries may have
similar levels of corruption risk but significantly different distributions of that risk. In some countries cor-
ruption risk is more prevalent in the center of the network, while in others among peripheral actors. We
also found that the degree of centralization in procurement markets overall is a strong predictor of their
global corruption risk and low quality of government. Another dimension of heterogeneity is the degree
of clustering of corruption risk: though corruption risk is significantly clustered in all countries in our
data, the extent of the clustering varies between 2 to 8 times what is expected under a sector-preserving
randomization.
These heterogeneities are not merely curious artifacts in the data. They have significant implications
for anti-corruption policy. For example, when corruption risk is centralized, it is likely that the central
government itself is a hotbed of corruption, and should not be trusted to address the problem. If
corruption risk is highly clustered, successful investigations of corruption should snowball by following
up with “nearby” actors.
We suggest several directions to extend this work. For instance, considering that corruption is known
to vary considerably at the regional level [32], geographic information about the locations of issuers and
winners could enhance our analysis [46]. Our approach aggregates both corruption risk and network
structure over time - certainly it is the case that corruption can change over time. Past work on the
response of corrupt networks to political turnover suggests that procurement markets are significantly
rewired following changes of government [69]. Comparative analyses and case studies using this data and
approach promise to enhance our understanding of the different ways corruption works, and potentially
how it can be limited.
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Figure 10: The relative prevalence of corruption risk in the core of the market plotted against its tendency
to cluster, plotted for countries with above average single bidding rates in the EU, 2008-2016.
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6 Appendix
Here we report additional information about the cores of the procurement markets in each country.
Country Core #Contracts Share #Winners #Issuers #Edges %Single bid.
AT 696 0.21 111 25 168 0.14
BE 1680 0.25 188 92 382 0.14
BG 3923 0.44 162 61 1287 0.18
CY 390 0.42 32 3 41 0.39
CZ 2764 0.34 218 88 663 0.26
DE 6973 0.21 802 229 1827 0.16
DK 1342 0.27 147 45 323 0.11
EE 441 0.21 63 12 120 0.19
ES 7182 0.36 529 158 3206 0.18
FI 1712 0.27 167 50 661 0.15
FR 39462 0.32 2829 582 16345 0.14
GR 715 0.18 122 23 267 0.26
HU 1949 0.34 163 56 412 0.27
IE 682 0.24 91 9 111 0.02
IT 6958 0.38 462 156 1980 0.29
LT 5414 0.57 94 27 711 0.17
LV 4664 0.46 161 27 481 0.18
NL 1137 0.16 176 63 344 0.08
NO 552 0.15 87 28 233 0.06
PL 66963 0.61 896 455 14483 0.44
PT 653 0.26 67 20 116 0.22
RO 12087 0.59 165 106 2367 0.14
SE 1761 0.17 268 33 686 0.04
SI 2632 0.39 90 84 976 0.19
SK 934 0.34 68 28 144 0.37
UK 8511 0.25 1072 119 2058 0.08
Table 2: The core statistics of each national market, averaged over 2008-2016. Core share refers to the
share of overall contracts awarded that are between core issuers and winners.
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